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Abstract: Many Colombians are confronted with the ongoing conflict that influences their 
decision making in everyday life, including their behavior in labor markets. This study 
focuses on the impact of violent conflict on self-employment, enlarging the usual 
determinants with a set of conflict variables.  In order to estimate the effect of conflict on self-
employment, we employ fixed effects estimation. Three datasets are combined for estimation: 
the Familias en Acción dataset delivers information about individuals, a second dataset 
contains different indicators of the Colombian conflict at the municipality level and the third 
dataset includes taxes to measure a municipality’s economic situation. Our results show that 
high homicide and displacement rates in the community of origin reduces self-employment, 
while a high influx of displaced increases the probability of self-employment in the 
destination municipality.   
 
JEL classification codes: C23, J16, J24, O10 
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1. Introduction 
Does violent conflict impact the share of (informal) self-employed workers in developing 
countries? To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that specifically deals with the 
effects of civil war on self-employment. For this reason our aim is to bridge this research gap 
by analyzing the effect of conflict on the probability to be self-employed.  
 
We investigate this topic focusing on rural Colombia, an area with all the ingredients for this 
kind of study: on the one hand it has suffered a violent conflict for more than 40 years and, on 
the other hand, the share of self-employed increased from 20 to 30% over the last 20 years. 
Last, but not least, detailed datasets at the micro-level are available for multiple years, 
allowing us to use of panel data estimation techniques.  
 
Our results show that the effects of conflict on self-employment vary by type of conflict 
indicator: high rates of displacement lower the probability of being self-employed in the 
community of origin and increase the share of self-employed in the municipality of 
destination. This finding implies that conflict – or to put it more accurately the consequences 
of conflict – has a geographically different impact on self-employment. Furthermore, it means 
that conflict not only impacts the self-employed living in directly-affected communities but 
also on self-employment shares in communities that experience the consequences of conflict 
but not the conflict itself. Additionally, we find some gender-specific differences: current and 
past homicide rates do have a strong negative impact on men’s self-employment, but not for 
women.  
 
The results of our study contribute to two strands of literature: the self-employment and the 
conflict literature. The literature in these areas is growing rapidly. Most research in self-
employment focuses on the impact of earnings, access to capital as well as individual 
characteristics like gender, education, labor market experience and attitude to risk, but none of 
these studies investigate the effect of conflict on self-employment. 
 
 The conflict literature concentrates mainly on the impact of conflict on poverty, education, 
migration, health, household welfare and consumption (Justino and Verwimp 2006; Grun 
2008; Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Shemyakina 2006; Bundervoet et al. 2009; Rodríguez and 
Sánchez 2009). Research on the effects of civil conflict on labor markets, especially at the 3 
 
micro-level, is virtually not existent with only a few notable exceptions: Deininger (2003) 
detects that violent conflict leads to a reduction in investment of non-agricultural enterprises 
in Uganda; Kondylis (2007) finds a higher unemployment rate for displaced men in Bosnia-
Herzegowina; while the results of Calderón and Ibáñez (2009) suggest that a large number of 
internal refugees leads to an expansion of the informal economy at the community of 
destination, accompanied by a significant decrease in earnings in this sector.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of the 
self-employment literature and introduces some background on Colombia’s economy and its 
conflict. In the third and forth section we describe the datasets and present some descriptive 
statistics on the main variables of interest, respectively. The econometric results are presented 
and discussed in the fifth and sixth section. Section seven concludes. 
 
2. Motivation 
A. Related Literature 
In the specialized literature, self-employed workers are defined as individuals who are not 
remunerated by a wage or a salary but who gain their income by working on their own 
account and bearing their own risk (Parker 2004).  According to the definition, the self-
employed comprise a highly heterogeneous group of workers: on the one hand there is the 
successful entrepreneur who runs a profitable business, invents new products and is 
constantly looking for new market opportunities. On the other hand, self-employment is a 
survival strategy for those who are not able to find a job. In practice, most data on self-
employment rely on labor force and household surveys where individuals are asked to report 
their employment status.  
 
The core question in that area of research is: what motivates an individual to become self-
employed? From an economist’s point of view, an individual will make a rational choice 
decision: He will prefer self-employment over the alternatives of wage-employment, 
unemployment or being economically inactive if the expected utility from being self-






In industrialized countries, the utility of self-employment is often compared to the utility of 
wage-employment, assuming implicitly that a person has the possibility of taking a job as an 
employee at any time. However, Haile (2008) points out that this cannot be taken for granted 
in developing countries. Citizens of these countries, especially those with low levels of 
education, may only have the possibility to choose between self-employment and 
unemployment in many cases.  As there are no unemployment benefits in the majority of low- 
and middle-income countries, the expected utility of being unemployed is supposed to be zero 
and thus at all times people favor self-employment over unemployment.  The choice between 
self-employment and being economically inactive is often relevant for the spouse and children 
in the household. Leibovich et al. (2006) observe that in Colombia secondary household 
members retire from labor markets when the head of household earns more.  
 
The rational choice approach can be linked with a reduced-form model where different factors 
are postulated as determinants of self-employment. These can be grouped into three 
categories, namely (i) monetary parameters; (ii) individual abilities, tastes and preferences; 
and (iii) institutions and macroeconomic conditions. Perhaps one of the most prominent 
arguments from the first category is the so-called earnings differential, which states that 
people choose to be self-employed if their expected income is higher than it would be with 
wage employment. Empirical evidence for this hypothesis is provided by Bernhardt (1994) 
for Canada, Taylor (1996) for the UK, Johansson (2000) for Finland, and Destre and Henrard 
(2004) for Colombia, who find evidence of negative selection into self-employment. Evidence 
against this hypothesis is found in Hamilton (2000), who argues that self-employed earn a 
lower initial income and earnings grow at a lower rate than for paid employment, hence there 
must be non-pecuniary benefits as well.  
 
Other monetary parameters that are mentioned in the literature of self-employment include 
initial wealth distribution (Banerjee and Newman 1993; Mesnard and Ravaillon 2001; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2009) as well as access to credit and capital (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; 
and Bernhardt 1994).  
 
Individual abilities, tastes, and preferences are comprised of attitudes to risk, education, labor 
market experience, family background, personal characteristics, preference for autonomy and 
gender.  Empirical evidence on these factors is mixed. On the one hand, a number of studies 
for developed countries find that being white, male and married, having labor market 5 
 
experience and a self-employed parent increase the probability of becoming self-employed 
(Hundley 2000; Eren and Sula 2009). On the other hand, researchers conclude that women in 
Mexico, often without substantial labor market experience, tend to favor self-employment 
since it can be more easily combined with household chores and looking after children than 
wage employment (González and Villarreal 2006). A positive attitude to risk and preference 
for autonomy favors self-employment over wage employment (Hundley 2000; Hamilton 
2000; Cramer et al. 2002; Fairlie 2002; and Kan and Tsai 2006). Possibly the most 
controversial role is the influence of education on the probability to become self-employed. 
Some argue that education enhances managerial ability, which increases probability of 
entrepreneurship while others point out that higher levels of education generate better options 
in wage employment reducing self-employment with rising levels of education.  On the 
contrary, in models where informal self-employment is considered as state of last resort, it is 
the least educated who (involuntarily) choose this occupation (see Jacobs (2007) for a 
theoretical model and van der Sluis et al. (2005) for an overview of empirical studies for 
developing countries).  
 
The impact of age is not clear-cut as age affects the probability to become self-employed 
through various channels. With rising age, individuals accumulate physical and human capital 
that makes it easier to become self-employed successfully in a challenging environment.  Yet, 
it is also observed that older people who become unemployed and do not have a real chance 
to get another job in the formal labor market choose to engage in self-employment activities 
to earn their living.  
 
Until now, there is just a scarce literature on the impact of conflict on labor market outcomes 
in general. Deininger (2003) investigates the link between civil strife and non-agricultural 
micro-enterprises in Uganda, concluding that violent conflict leads to a reduction in 
investment and the establishment of non-agricultural enterprises.  Additionally, two papers 
deal with the effect of displacement on labor market outcomes: Kondylis (2007) compares the 
displaced to stayers in post-war Bosnia-Herzegowina, finding a higher unemployment rate for 
displaced men. Calderón and Ibáñez (2009) investigate the impact of internal refugees on 
labor markets at urban area destinations in Colombia. They report that wages in the informal 
sector decrease due to an influx of additional labor, but wages remain constant in the formal 
sector because of a binding minimum wage. Moreover, the surge in labor supply due to the 6 
 
influx of displaced population in urban areas increases the likelihood of employment in the 
informal sector.  
 
We also expect violent conflict not only to have an impact on wages and unemployment but 
also on the probability to become self-employed and/or to exit self-employment. There are 
various channels through which conflict, depending on the intensity, type and consequences, 
may influence self-employment. The direction of the impact not only depends on the conflict, 
but also on the economic structure of the municipality and whether the community is affected 
directly or indirectly by the conflict. A municipality is directly affected if it is attacked by 
illegally armed groups and suffers high homicide rates. As a consequence, some of the 
population starts leaving the municipality and relocates to other municipalities. The 
municipalities receiving internally displaced persons are those that are indirectly affected by 
the conflict. Thus, the effects of conflict are not equal across the country and there are 
geographical differences. In the following, some possible effects of conflict on self-
employment are discussed: 
 
I. For directly-affected communities 
Hypothesis 1: Conflict is likely to reduce self-employment activities in directly affected 
communities with a predominant (informal) subsistence economy through two channels. As 
soon as conflict reaches a municipality, the public order deteriorates in most cases. As a 
consequence of the worsening security situation, some individuals will decide to leave the 
municipality. Moreover, some families might not be able to move but come to the conclusion 
that it is better if secondary household members stop working because protection from 
conflict is better at home than at the working place. In developing countries, self-employment 
in agriculture or certain types of services might be especially risky in times of conflict. The 
consequence is a decrease in the share of self-employment relative to other forms of 
employment.  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is no clear effect of conflict on self-employment in communities that are 
not just characterized by subsistence activities but also have a formal industrial and services 
sector. On the one hand, we might observe all the effects mentioned in hypothesis 1 leading to 
a decrease of self-employment. On the other hand, firms in the formal sector could close due 
to an unstable environment, thus leaving workers unemployed. Some of these workers, 
especially if they are the head of household and/or are not in a position to move to other 7 
 
municipalities, might become self-employed in order to earn a living for their family. This 
behavior leads to an increase in self-employment in conflict-affected communities. Which 
effect prevails, is an empirical matter and cannot be easily determined in advance.  
 
II. For indirectly-affected communities 
Hypothesis 3: Conflict increases the share of self-employment in indirectly-affected 
communities living on subsistence activities. This is due to an influx of people that has two 
effects. First, for internally displaced people reaching the community it is necessary to find a 
job in order to survive, since in developing countries state provided benefits for these people 
are limited.  
 
Second, for the inhabitants of the community, the influx of people may represent an 
opportunity to gain some extra income by satisfying the increased demand for certain goods. 
This, in turn, leads to an increase in self-employment, assuming that jobs mainly emerge in 
the informal sector. This is likely to be the case because in low and middle income countries 
the majority of jobs in the small scale services and agricultural sector are created in the 
informal economy. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Conflict has an ambiguous impact on communities that do not just experience 
an influx of people but also a relocation of firms from conflict-affected regions. These 
municipalities undergo the same changes as in hypothesis 3 but the relocated firms will also 
create new jobs. This causes an increase in formal sector employment. The total effect 




In 1999, Colombia experienced its most severe recession of the 20
th century, with GDP 
shrinking by 4.5%, and unemployment rates in urban areas nearing 20% (CEPAL 2000). As 
pointed out by Peña and Mondragón-Vélez (2008) self-employment rises with 
unemployment, but does not diminish when unemployment decreases. As a result of the 
economic crisis, the share of non-wage earners in the working population increased to more 
than 40%, an increase of more than 10% since 1992.  
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The self-employed tend to be less educated, are older and earn less than paid workers. Most 
self-employed are concentrated in the agricultural and services sector. Around 80% of 
Colombia’s self-employed individuals are active in the informal sector (i.e. not contributing to 
the health system). Peña and Mondragón-Vélez (2008) conclude that self-employment in 
Colombia is not an initial step towards entrepreneurship, but that it is instead a subsistence 
activity.  
 
During our period of study, 2002-2006, the Colombian economy recovered from its recession 
and grew at an average annual rate of 5% (National Administrative Department of Statistics).  
At the same time, extreme poverty in rural areas fell by 13% from 34.7% in 2002 to 21.5% in 
2006 (Perfetti 2009).  
 
Growth rates during the same period were highly heterogeneous across departments, ranging 
from -17% to more than 6%. Meléndez and Harker (2008) describe a link between economic 
growth and conflict: regions whose coca plantations were eradicated display the lowest 
growth rates while those where coca cultivation relocated and/or paramilitaries are present are 
among those regions with the highest growth rates. With respect to the firm-level, the re-
establishment of public order due to a termination of paramilitary violence favors investment.  
 
II. Conflict 
The Colombian conflict has its roots in the unequal distribution of land and wealth. It was 
fuelled by the establishment of two left wing guerrilla groups in the 1960s, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) (Guigale et al. 
2002). As to protect themselves against these groups, landowners and drug lords started right 
wing paramilitary groups. In the second half of the 1980s violence related to the narcotics 
business increased. In the 1990s, the guerrilla became involved in the drug business as well, 
which further intensified the ongoing conflict (Meléndez and Harker 2008). 
 
  As a result of the conflict between 1998 and 2008, 4.2 million people were internally 
displaced, representing about 10% of the population (Calderón and Ibáñez 2009).  
 
In 2002, the beginning of our period of study, Álvaro Uribe was elected president of 
Colombia. He put an emphasis on democratic security policy to regain state control over the 
Colombian territory. This aim was achieved by increasing military spending, expanding 9 
 
police presence to all municipalities, eradicating coca cultivation, fighting the guerrillas and 
demobilizing the paramilitaries. Results of this policy are mixed: on the one hand the number 
of kidnappings, homicides and paramilitaries reduced significantly but on the other hand 
newly emerging armed groups as well as increasing armed contacts are a signal that the war is 
still ongoing (International Crisis Group 2003; Presidencia de la República and Ministerio de 
Defensa Nacional 2003). 
 
3. The Data 
We use three types of data: (i) a household survey by the Familias en Acción program; (ii) a 
municipality level dataset on violence and conflict; and (iii) a dataset describing the economic 
situation of municipalities. The first dataset was established in order to analyze the effects of a 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program on nutrition, health and education of poor children 
aged 0-17 implemented by the Colombian government, the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank. The baseline survey was conducted in 2002, the first follow-up 
carried out in 2003 and the second follow-up in 2005 or 2006. We used the first and the sixth 
module of the survey for our analysis. In these modules, information about the socio-
economic structure of the household, housing conditions, household assets, education, access 
to infrastructure, usage of healthcare services, household consumption, labor supply, income 
and transfers were collected. 
 
 The second dataset, assembled by the Center of Economic Development Studies (CEDE), at 
the Universidad de los Andes, includes information about violence and conflict intensity 
(which is discussed in more detail later) and it also contains municipality characteristics. 
These characteristics include the department the municipality is located in, the total 
inhabitants of each municipality, as well as the share of urban and rural population at 
municipality level. Since the homicide rates are missing for the years 2005 and 2006, we 
augment this dataset with data on homicide rates obtained from the National Administrative 
Department of Statistics (DANE) and the National Police. 
 
The third dataset comes from Colombia´s National Planning Department (DNP) and 
comprises information on the municipality´s industrial and commercial taxes (ICA). Since 
taxes are reported in nominal Colombian pesos we converted them into real Colombian pesos 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculated by DANE. Tax collection indicators capture 10 
 
the municipality´s economic situation, which affects labor demand and may also impact the 
level of violence.  
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
A.  Self-Employment  
The household survey data coming from the Familias en Acción dataset includes information 
on 57,764 individuals living in 9,526 poor households in 121 municipalities (baseline 
figures). Of these individuals, 68% are ten years or older in the baseline survey, meaning that 
they are part of the working age population, according to the Colombian definition for rural 
areas (Martínez 1998). Table 1 shows basic summary statistics on households.  
 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The average household consists of six members. The mean age of the sample is 23.8 years. 
About 18% of the sample population is a head of household, 13% are a spouse and 
approximately 52% are the sons or daughters of the head of household. Looking at the age 
group of 10 years or older, about 15% of household members have no education, while 60% 
have some primary education (incomplete/complete), and 27% have some secondary 
education (incomplete/complete).  
 
We study labor market outcomes of the working age population in the sample. For this 
purpose, we create two indicators: one describing the individual’s labor market status, and the 
second describing their employment status (only for employed individuals). According to 
DANE definitions, the labor market status comprises of three categories (Martínez 1998): 
working, being unemployed and being economically inactive. Working is defined as (i) 
having worked the last week; or (ii) the individual did not work during the last week but has a 
job; or (iii) the person participated in an activity in exchange for money; or (iv) the household 
member worked in a family / friend’s enterprise without payment at least 15 hours per week. 
By definition an individual is unemployed if they searched for a job during the last week but 
do not currently hold a job.  The “economically inactive” category includes all others, 
including, for example, pensioners, students, and stay-at-home spouses. The economically 
active population contains both working and unemployed individuals. 
 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 11 
 
 
Only between 2.4% and 2.8% of the labor force is unemployed. This is substantially lower 
than the average national unemployment rate during that same period. One possible 
explanation for this low unemployment rate is given by Attanasio et al. (2004), who point out 
that in Familias en Acción’s case unemployment is defined as being unemployed or looking 
for a job only in  the last week and excludes people who were looking for a job the weeks 
before. Perfetti (2009) mentions two possible factors for the low unemployment rate in rural 
areas of Colombia: on the one hand, many people are underemployed instead of unemployed 
meaning that they do not appear in unemployment statistics and on the other hand there are 
methodological problems that make measuring unemployment rates in rural areas difficult.  
 
There is a shift from having a job to pursuing other activities across the waves, as shown in 
table 2. There are two possible explanations for this. First, the economy recovered from a 
recession during the period of study, which improved household economic situations. 
Leibovich et al. (2006) points out that household members, other than the head of household, 
withdraw from the labor market when the head of household earns a higher wage, which is 
likely the case when there is a period of economic recovery. Spouses return to take care of the 
children and to concentrate on household chores, while sons and daughters continue schooling 
instead of working. A second point is that the subsidy received by the program also makes the 
households better off financially, which raises the probability of a spouse staying at home. 
Furthermore, an explicit goal of the Familias en Acción conditional cash-transfer program is 
that older children return to school.  
 
We classify employed individuals into three categories: having a paid job, working on one's 
own account or being an unpaid family worker. All categories require that an individual is 
employed. Workers who report having a paid job are wage earners and domestic employees. 
In contrast, working on one's own account includes the subcategory of independent workers 
or as well as those having a small business or participating as a partner in such a type of 
business. In what follows, the terms self-employment and self-employed are used 
interchangeably for working on one´s own account. Analogously, the terms employees and 
employed are used for paid workers.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 12 
 
Table 3 describes the employment categories described above. In the baseline and the first-
follow up, 52% are employed, and 43% declare working on their own account. 
Approximately 5% of employed individuals are unpaid family workers. At the second-follow 
up, we find that the share of self-employed fell to 37%, which is significantly lower than in 
the baseline or the first follow, while, at the same time, the share of paid workers rose to 60%. 
This pattern might be explained by the economic recovery during the period under study, 
which causes people to switch from own account to paid work. In fact, a recent survey by 
Perry et al. (2007) shows that only 41% of the independent workers in Colombia prefer that 
type of employment over paid work.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 shows the transition between being self-employed, employed or inactive between the 
baseline survey and the second follow-up. About 44% are self-employed in both waves, while 
23% switched from self-employment to being economically inactive and the remaining 33% 
changed from working on their own account to being a paid worker. Only 11% of those being 
economically inactive in the first wave decided to pursue self-employment in the third wave 
and approximately 20% left their job as an employee to become self-employed. Persistence of 
self-employment is lower compared to being inactive (69%) or employed (56%). This 
supports the finding that self-employment is not the preferred activity for Colombians. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 shows that self-employment rises steadily with age: while only 14-20% of individuals 
aged 10-20 are self-employed, it increases to between 59 and 65% for individuals who are at 
least 60. Several explanations are possible for this finding. First, it may be the case that 
younger people lack sufficient physical and human capital to run a shop or a restaurant. 
Second, it is also important to take into account that a large share of self-employment is in 
agriculture. Thus, parents may own the farm and be self-employed in the agricultural sector 
while their children are employed either at their parent´s farm or work for another farm or 
firm. When the parents retire, they pass their farm to their children, and the children change 
from employment to self-employment. 
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 A third explanation is that it may be more difficult for older people to find a job as an 
employee once they became unemployed. As a result of unemployment, older individuals 
often have no other choice than to become self-employed. Additionally, many people in 
Colombia, especially the poor population working in the informal sector, do not contribute to 
a pension fund meaning that people must earn their living up to old age. In our survey, 
employment overwhelmingly takes place in the informal sector: none of the self-employed 
workers contribute to a pension fund; while 8.8% of the salaried employees do. 
 
Concerning the working hours, about one third of the self-employed work 30 hours per week, 
or less, while around 40% work 30-50 hours per week. The remaining 27% work more than 
50 hours per week. Self-employed men work more than self-employed women: while more 
than 50% of the women work 30 hours per week or less, more than half of the men work 40 
hours or more. 
  
The monthly income of self-employed workers is low: more than 70% have an income less 
than 300,000 pesos in the first wave, which is equal to US$123 using 2002 exchange rates. 
This figure is slightly below the minimum wage in Colombia, which was fixed at 309,000 
pesos (US$127) in 2002. However, as Attanasio et al. (2004) points out, estimated 
consumption expenditure is greater than income. Likewise, it might be the case that 
respondents did not indicate their true level of income since they might have feared exclusion 
from the program. Perfetti (2009) argues that it is difficult to measure income of the rural 
population accurately.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 shows further disaggregation of self-employment into different categories: 41% to 
49% of the self-employed have a farm or land to cultivate, depending on the wave in which 
the information was collected. Approximately 30-35% of the self-employed people work on 
their own account in the services sector. This share includes those with a shop,  restaurant, or 
sewing room. The industrial sector plays only a minor role, with 5% working there.  More 
than 50% of self-employed men are active in agriculture but only about 10-14% of self-
employed women are. Women tend to be more active in the services sector, have a small shop 
or a restaurant or work in the industrial sector. 
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B. Violence and Conflict 
There are a variety of conflict and violence indicators available for Colombia. For our 
analysis we use four: the homicide rate, displacement rate by receiving municipality, 
displacement rate by expulsing municipality, and the number of attacks against civilians 
committed by armed groups. Descriptive statistics for these indicators are presented in table 7. 
Although the homicide rate is not the most appropriate indicator for conflict, since about 80% 
of the homicides in Colombia are the result of common violence and drug trafficking, it is still 
correlated with other conflict variables (Restrepo et al. 2003; and Grun 2008). The other 
indicators can typically be traced back directly to the conflict. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The homicide rate is measured as number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. The average 
homicide rate in our sample is 44, with the minimum zero and maximum 683. The median is 
below the mean, with 28 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants and in 99% of the cases, the 
homicide rate is below 300 homicides, displaying a highly skewed distribution. The homicide 
rate consistently decreases across waves, which can be at least partly attributed to the 
implementation of President Uribe’s democratic security policy. 
 
Displacement is divided into two categories: by expulsing and by receiving municipality. 
From CEDE’s displacement and population data, we calculate the displacement rate per 
100,000 inhabitants. As displayed in table 7, there is a large difference between the mean and 
the median of displacement rates meaning that some municipalities experienced very high 
rates of displacement, while the majority of municipalities only experienced modest 
displacement. Only 5% of municipalities did not lose any inhabitants through displacement, 
while about 7.5% did not receive any displaced people.  
 
About 33% of the municipalities experienced at least one attack against the civilian 
population during the period under study. On average, municipalities suffer one attack by an 
armed group per year. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commits the 
most attacks, followed by the United Self-Defence Forces (AUC) and the National Liberation 
Army (ELN). 
 
C. Conflict and Self-Employment 15 
 
Table 8 displays the share of self-employed individuals in both high and low level conflict 
areas using the aforementioned indicators. A municipality is in the “high” category if its 
homicide or displacement rate is above the median or if the municipality suffered at least one 
attack per year.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Self-employment rates are lower in municipalities that experience a high number of 
homicides and/or at least one attack against civilians. This result is in line with our hypotheses 
for the informal subsistence economy in table 1. However, the relationship between 
displacement and self-employment is not that clear. Communities that lost many inhabitants 
due to displacement exhibit a significantly lower share of self-employment than 
municipalities with low displacement in the first wave, but higher shares of own-account 
workers in the second and third wave. In the baseline, there is no difference in self-
employment shares for communities receiving a high number of displaced persons compared 
to municipalities receiving a few refugees. In the first follow-up, there are significantly fewer 
people self-employed in municipalities that experienced a relatively high influx of displaced. 
In contrast, there are significantly more people working on their own-account in high 
displacement-affected (receiving) municipalities than in communities less affected by 
displacement. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
Table 9 displays the shares of economically inactive, self-employed, and employed 
individuals at different levels of displacement for the baseline and the second follow-up in 
order to observe whether changes in the displacement level lead to changes in the shares of 
self-employment. Self-employment tends to be higher in the first wave than in the third wave 
across all levels of displacement. Self-employment drops strongly in those municipalities that 
received the displaced during the first wave, but did not experience high levels of 
displacement in the third wave. 
 
5. Estimation Strategy 
In this section, we investigate the impact of conflict on self-employment econometrically. We 
use fixed effects estimation to exploit the panel data structure that allows us to control for 16 
 
time-invariant individual heterogeneity, which may bias cross sectional results. We run 
regressions of the form 
yit = β0 + Xitβ + Citγ + αi + βt+ uit 
 
where yit is an indicator of self-employment, Xit is a vector of individual, household and 
municipality characteristics, Cit  includes our vector conflict variables, αi  captures a time-
invariant unobserved individual effect, βt captures systematic variation across time (time fixed 
effect), and uit is the usual error term. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. The 
sample is restricted to individuals aged 10 years and above and to communities that have 
experienced conflict directly or indirectly.  
 
We use two different indicators for self-employment: in tables 10, 12 and 13 the dependent 
variable takes the value 1 if the individual is self-employed and 0 for all remaining activities 
(including those not active in the labor market). In tables 11 and 14-16 we restrict the sample 
to the working population and code the dummy 1 for an own-account worker and 0 for paid 
employees or unpaid family workers. We run 7 different specifications: in the first column of 
tables 10 and 11 all covariates and conflict variables are included, column 2 drops individual 
and household characteristics, in column 3 municipality characteristics are excluded, columns 
4-6 each leaves out one of the conflict variables and in the last specification only conflict 
variables are included. In order to observe if certain groups of the population are especially 
sensitive for the impact of conflict on self-employment, we interact displacement rates with 
age groups, gender, household position and educational level.  Additionally, we run all 
specifications separately for men and women to account for gender-specific differences. 
Moreover, we did some robustness-checks by running the regressions for different age 
groups.  
 
6. Discussion of Results 
 
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 here] 
 
Looking at tables 10 and 11, regardless of the definition of the dependent variable and other 
variables, the homicide and the displacement rate by expulsing community always impacts 
self-employment negatively. The magnitude of this effect is constant across specifications and 17 
 
is of the same order for both independent variables. This result reinforces the observation that 
in regions with high homicide rates there are fewer own-account workers. Some explanations 
were given in section 2: when security and public order worsen, secondary household 
members might prefer to stay at home than engaging in risky self-employment activities. At 
the same time, some households with self-employed members might decide to leave the 
municipality and migrate to safer areas. This behavior reduces the share of self-employed at 
the location of origin.  
 
Displacement by receiving community has a positive impact on the probability of self-
employment. This means that in those municipalities that receive a large number of internal 
refugees, the share of self-employed increases. As mentioned in hypothesis 3 in section 2, 
there are two possible causes for this effect: on the one hand it might be the displaced 
exercising self-employment in the municipality of destination. On the other hand, it could be 
that inhabitants exploit the opportunity of rising demand for some goods switching from 
being inactive or employed to self-employment activities.  
 
[Insert Tables 12-15 here] 
 
As we observe in tables 12-15, there are gender-specific differences: for men, homicide rates 
have a negative impact on the probability to be self-employed. For women, however, this 
effect vanishes almost completely. The homicide rate does not affect the probability of self-
employment for the group of economically active women. For the entire female population 
(aged 10 and above), higher homicide rates in the past reduce the probability of current self-
employment. This difference between men and women can be explained by the fact that it is 
mostly men who are directly affected by homicides. Some self-employment activities might 
be more exposed to being the victim of a homicide. As a consequence, men try to avoid these 
activities. This behavior decreases the share of self-employed men.    
 
Women, on the other hand, might be more affected by the indirect effects of a high homicide 
rate. High homicides rate can, in the long run, undermine public order.  When security 
situations deteriorate, women prefer to stay at home and exit self-employment. However, if 
women are reliant on working (as in the case of female headed households) it makes no 
difference for them whether they are self-employed or an employee. 
 18 
 
Displacement rates, both by receiving and expulsing municipality, have the aforementioned 
effects for men and women, with the impact strongest for the group of employed women. 
 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
 
Table 16 shows regression results for interacting displacement rates with age groups, gender, 
household position, and educational level. By including these interaction variables we could 
determine if selected sub-groups of the sample are more susceptible to the (in-)direct effects 
of conflict on self-employment. There is a trend that the self-employment activities of 25 to 
40 year-olds and their spouses are more affected by displacement than other age groups and 
household positions. We check whether these differences are statistically significant by 
performing an F-test. Results indicate that there is no significant difference for any of the 
groups. One explanation could be that our sample only comprises the poorest households, 
which are all equally vulnerable to conflict.  
 
Control variables 
We only could include time-variant control variables due to fixed effects estimation. 
Consequently we are not able to include control variables like education, gender and 
household position as in the cross-section studies mentioned in section 2, since they have a 
very reduced within-individual variability, in fact measurement error (and the problems 
related to it) may be magnified by the fixed effect strategy. However, our estimation method 
controls for both observable and unobservable differences between individuals that are time-
invariant, which is not possible with cross-sectional data. In our specifications we included 
age, squared age, household’s dependency ratio, household size, population, an indicator that 
the person lives in the municipality’s capital city (cabecera) to account for rural-urban 
differences, industrial and commercial taxes per capita that control for geographic variation in 
economic activity, and a treatment dummy to indicate whether an individual participated in 
the Familias en Acción program (which may affect our outcomes of interest). Most of the 
controls, especially municipality characteristics are insignificant which might be a result of 
fixed effects absorbing most of the overall variance. When significant, age has a positive 
effect on self-employment, a finding that is supported in other empirical studies about this 
subject. Household size has a negative impact on self-employment for men and is 
insignificant for women. This difference might be explained by the fact that in most 19 
 
households the man, as the head of household, is still the breadwinner of the family and 




Do violent conflicts impact (informal) self-employed workers in developing countries? Our 
aim is to make a first attempt at resolving this question by analyzing the effects of conflict on 
the probability to be a self-employed worker in rural Colombia.  
 
We compile a data set combining information from three preexisting datasets to obtain 
information on individuals, households, municipalities on the one hand and conflict 
information on the other hand. For conflict variables we include homicide rates, displacement 
rates and the number of attacks by illegal armed groups. Our results show that high homicide 
and displacement rates at the community of origin reduce self-employment while a high 
influx of displaced increases the probability of self-employment at the municipality of 
destination. Additionally, we detect some gender-specific differences with respect to the 
homicide rates.  
 
There are three possible explanations for a decreasing share of self-employment workers in 
municipalities with high rates of homicides and/or displacement.  First, if many people of a 
municipality get displaced, there is less demand for goods that might have previously been 
produced or sold by self-employed individuals. As a consequence, some cease self-
employment and start looking for other employment opportunities, resume studying, or just 
stay at home. Second, some of the self-employed are directly affected by displacement and 
cannot carry on with their former activity. An example for this case is self-employment in 
agriculture: at their municipality of origin the family owned land to cultivate but after 
displacement, family members must look for other occupations.  Third, high homicide rates 
lead to a public order disruption. Men and women are affected in different ways: some self-
employment activities bear a higher risk to be a homicide victim than other employment 
opportunities. This is especially true for men, who represent the majority of homicides. Thus, 
they switch immediately to other forms of employment in order to prevent their own death, 
which, in turn, decreases the share of self-employed men in regions with high homicide rates.  
Women, in turn, suffer from the municipality’s worsening security and stay at home 
whenever possible.  20 
 
 
In a nutshell, the answer to the question posed above is: yes, conflict impacts self-employed 
workers. This influence, however, depends on the geographical location of the community: 
conflict lowers self-employment rates in directly-affected municipalities and increases the 
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8. Appendix 
Table 1: Basic Summary Statistics Familias en Acción at Baseline  
   Mean SD 
Age  22,72 18,14 
   Age by gender:    
      Female  22,97 17,88 
      Male  22,47 18,40 
Indicator: Person is…    
   …Male  0,506  
   …Head of household  0,164  
   …Spouse  0,132  
   …Son/daughter  0,520  
Household Size  6,85 2,76 
Indicator: Person has…    
   …No education (>=10 years)  0,142  
   … by gender:    
      Female  0,139  
      Male  0,145  
   …Some primary education (>=10 years)  0,596  
   … by gender:    
      Female  0,584  
      Male  0,607  
   …Some secondary education (>=10 years)  0,262  
   … by gender:    
      Female  0,277  
      Male  0,247  
Indicator: Person has a job  0,632  
   by gender:    
      Female  0,398  
      Male  0,803  
Hours worked per week  43,08 18,44 
   by gender:    
      Female  38,77 20,98 
      Male  44,69 17,13 
Total Household income (Pesos)  298.857 327.298 
No. Rooms  2,77 1,20 
Indicator: Household has access to/possesses…    
   …Electricity  0,869  
   …Gas  0,087  
   …Aquaduct  0,616  
  …Sanitation  0,243  
   …Waste  0,304  
   …Refrigerator  0,308  
   …Sewing Machine  0,101  
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Table 2: Labor Market Status for individuals aged 10 and above 
   1. Wave    2. Wave    3. Wave   
   N  Percent N Percent N  Percent 
Unemployed  574  2,36 576 2,38 666  2,77 
Working  15.340 63,19  13.664  56,45 12.963  53,87 
Inactive  8.363  34,45 9.966 41,17  10.433  43,36 
Total  24.277  100,00 24.206 100,00 24.062  100,00 
 
 
Table 3: Employment Status for individuals aged 10 and above  
   1. Wave    2. Wave    3. Wave   
   N Percent N Percent N  Percent 
Paid worker  7.941 52,20 7.193 52,65 7.736  59,78 
Own account worker  6.504 42,76 5.788 42,37 4.787  36,99 
Unpaid family worker  767 5,04 680 4,98 418  3,23 
Total  15.212 100,00 13.661 100,00 12.941  100,00 
 
 
Table 4: Transition between activities between wave 1 and wave 3 
1. Wave  3. Wave  Inactive  Self-Employed  Employe
d  Total 
Inactive  N 4.515  697  1.355  6.567 
   Percent 68,75  10,61  20,63  100 
Self-Employed  N 1.221  2.363  1.781  5.365 
   Percent 22,76  44,04  33,20  100 
Employed  N 1.563  1.297  3.627  6.487 
   Percent 24,09  19,99  55.91  100 
Total  N 7.299  4.357  6.763  18.419 
   Percent 39,63  23,65  36,72  100 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Own Account Workers 
   1. Wave    2. Wave    3. Wave   
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Indicator: Person works on his own 
account…  0,429 0,495 0,423 0,494 0,368 0,482 
   …By gender:        
      Female  0,379 0,485 0,395 0,489 0,353 0,478 
      Male  0,447 0,497 0,433 0,495 0,374 0,484 
   …By household position        
      Not head of household  0,323 0,468 0,326 0,469 0,269 0,443 
       Head of household  0,530 0,499 0,507 0,500 0,456 0,498 
   …By age        
      10-20  0,201 0,401 0,203 0,402 0,144 0,352 
      20-30  0,327 0,469 0,313 0,464 0,243 0,429 
      30-40  0,452 0,498 0,439 0,496 0,374 0,484 
      40-50  0,531 0,499 0,514 0,500 0,459 0,498 
      50-60  0,586 0,493 0,563 0,496 0,507 0,500 
      >60  0,659 0,474 0,650 0,477 0,593 0,492 
 
 
Table 6: Type of Self-Employment 
   1. Wave    2. Wave    3. Wave   
   N  Percent N Percent N Percent 
Farm/Cultivation  2.641  44,95 2.820 48.87 1.948 40.98 
Shop  339  5,77 368 6,38 276 5,81 
Restaurant  142 2,42  165  2,86 85  1,79 
Sewing  52  0,88 52 0,90 43 0,90 
Industry  293  4,99 311 5,39 263 5,53 
Services  780  13,27 1.338 23,18 1.105 23.25 
Other  1.629 27,72 717 12,42  1.033  21,73 


















Table 7: Violence and Conflict Data 
1. Wave     2. Wave     3. Wave     Total    
Median Mean SD  Median Mean SD  Median Mean SD  Median Mean  SD 
Homicide rate (per 100.000 inhabitants)           
32  50 66  31  52 61  23  32 31  28  44 55 
Displacement (per 100.000 inhabitants, by expulsing municipality)      
409 1615  2410  304 912  1603 398 825  1183 368  1117  1840 
Displacement (per 100.000 inhabitants, by receiving municipality)      
400 985  1520  181 464  843  221  422  531  245  624  1081 
Number of attacks by armed groups (ELN, AUC, FARC)       




Table 8: Self-Employment and Conflict 
   1. Wave    2. Wave    3. Wave   
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Person works on his own account…        
   …By homicide rate        
      Low  0,488 0,499 0,446 0,497 0,386 0,487 
      High  0,380 0,485 0,404 0,490 0,349 0,477 
      T-test low vs. high   13,657   4,996   4,281 
   …By displacement (expulsing community)        
      Low  0,463 0,499 0,399 0,490 0,332 0,471 
      High  0,401 0,490 0,454 0,498 0,403 0,491 
      T-test low vs. high   7,723  -6,460   -8,412 
   …By displacement (receiving community)        
      Low  0,427 0,495 0,437 0,496 0,361 0,480 
      High  0,428 0,495 0,407 0,491 0,378 0,485 
      T-test low vs. high    -0,165  3,479  -2.044 
   …By attacks against civilians        
      No  0,461 0,498 0,426 0,494 0,377 0,485 
      Yes  0,372 0,484 0,420 0,494 0,352 0,478 
      T-test   10,727   0,583   2,643 
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Table 9: Labor Market Status and Displacement Level 
   1. Wave    3. Wave   
   N Percent N Percent 
Low level of displacement (receiving and expulsing) in both waves 
Inactive  1,413 40.57 1,610 47.20 
Self-Employed  922 26.47 559 16.39 
Employed  1,148 32.96 1,242 36.41 
Total  3,483 100 3,411 100 
High levels of displacement (receiving) in both waves   
Inactive  1,357 36.80 1,717 46.77 
Self-Employed  919 24.93 673 18.33 
Employed  1,411 38.27 1,281 34.90 
Total  3,687 100 3,671 100 
High levels of displacement (expulsing) in both waves   
Inactive  775 33.26  1,018  45.14 
Self-Employed  717 30.77 577 25.59 
Employed  838 35.97 660 29.27 
Total  2,330 100 2,255 100 
High levels of displacement (receiving and expulsing) in both waves 
Inactive  2,380 36.10 3,078 46.14 
Self-Employed  1,672 25.36 1,426 21.38 
Employed  2,540 38.53 2,167 32.48 
Total  6,592 100 6,671 100 
Low levels of displacement in the 1. wave to high levels of displacement (expulsing) in the 3. wave 
Inactive  259 39.30 287 42.33 
Self-Employed  159 24.13 165 24.34 
Employed  241 36.57 226 33.33 
Total  659 100 678 100 
High levels of displacement (expulsing) in the 1. wave to low levels of displacement in the 3. wave 
Inactive  235 31.80 324 45.89 
Self-Employed  188 25.44 124 17.56 
Employed  316 42.76 258 36.54 
Total  739 100 706 100 
High levels of displacement (receiving) in the 1. wave to low levels of displacement in the 3. wave 
Inactive  757 35.13  1,010  47.82 
Self-Employed  878 40.74 408 19.32 
Employed  520 24.13 694 32.86 
Total  2,155 100 2,112 100 
High levels of displacement (expulsing) in the 1. wave to high levels of displacement in the 3. wave 
Inactive  385 37.63 485 47.00 
Self-Employed  260 25.42 195 18.90 
Employed  378 36.95 352 34.11 
Total  1,023 100 1,032 100 
High levels of displacement in the 1. wave to high levels of displacement (expulsing) in the 3. wave 
Inactive  625 44.2 577  41.93 
Self-Employed  360 25.46 299 21.73 
Employed  429 30.34 500 36.34 
Total  1,414 100 1,376 100 
High levels of displacement in the 1. wave to low levels of displacement in the 3. wave 
Inactive  286 28.46 496 46.49 
Self-Employed  209 20.8 136  12.75 
Employed  510 50.75 435 40.77 
Total  1,005 100 1,067 100 
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Table 10: Probability of Self-Employment  
   1  2  3 4 5 6 7 
Age  0,022    0,023 0,021 0,022 0,022   
   (5,80)**    (6,16)** (5,84)** (6,16)** (5,79)**   
Age Squared  0,000    0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000   
   (6,66)**    (6,98)** (6,82)** (7,25)** (6,64)**   
Treatment  0,107    0,098 0,093 0,091 0,107   
   (12,62)**    (11,92)** (11,36)** (12,17)** (12,60)**   
Dependency Ratio  -0,001    0,000 -0,003 0,003 -0,001   
   (0,24)    (0,07) (0,63) (0,81) (0,24)   
Household Size  -0,042  -0,049  -0,040  -0,041  -0,042  
   (2,70)**    (3,27)** (2,74)** (2,82)** (2,69)**   
Population  -0,040 -0,046    -0,028  -0,041  -0,037   
   (2,08)* (2,56)*    (1,62)  (2,26)*  (1,93)   
Cabecera  -0,001 0,000    -0,003 -0,005 -0,001   
   (0,13)  (0,03)    (0,73) (1,07) (0,13)   
Tax/capita  -0,008  -0,001    -0,001 0,005 -0,010   
   (1,71)  (0,30)    (0,20) (1,35) (1,94)   
Homicide Rate  -0,017 -0,013 -0,020    -0,013 -0,015 -0,016 
   (5,15)** (3,89)** (6,24)**    (4,33)**  (4,93)** (5,05)** 
Lagged Homicide Rate  -0,016 -0,014 -0,010    -0,013 -0,016 -0,010 
   (4,09)** (3,59)** (2,88)**    (3,77)**  (4,16)** (2,68)** 
Displacement (receiving)  0,017 0,013 0,016 0,015    0,017 0,012 
   (6,48)** (4,79)** (6,14)** (6,31)**    (6,43)** (4,64)** 
Displacement (expulsing)  -0,017 -0,020 -0,015 -0,017  -0,017  -0,017 
   (4,26)** (4,96)** (3,66)** (4,53)**    (4,20)** (4,36)** 
Attacks  0,003 0,002 0,004 0,000  0,002    0,003 
   (1,54) (1,29)  (2,30)* (0,10)  (1,33)    (1,82) 
Constant  0,369  0,804  -0,131  0,210 0,325 0,329 0,326 
   (1,67)  (4,22)**  (1,29) (1,06) (1,60) (1,50)  (12,62)** 
Observations  53026  53496  54623 57468 59515 53026 55104 
Number of Groups  26102  26282  26345 27359 28222 26102 26525 
R-squared  0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01  0,01  0,02 0,01 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note:  The table reports fixed effects estimates for the probability to be self-employed. We use a binary dependent 
variable, taking the value 1 if a person is self-employed and 0 otherwise. All individuals aged 10 and above were 
included in the sample. Variables population, tax/capita, homicide rate, lagged homicide rate, and displacement 
rates are in logs. Cabecera is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if municipality’s cabecera to account for urban-
rural differences. Treatment is a dummy for participation in Familias en Acción. Time dummies were included. 
















Table 11: Probability of Self-Employment Conditional Being Employed 
   1  2  3 4 5 6 7 
Age  0,003    0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003   
   (0,42)    (0,59) (0,55) (0,49) (0,39)   
Age Squared  0,000    0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000   
   (0,97)    (0,89) (1,14) (1,02) (0,95)   
Treatment  0,162    0,139 0,145 0,134 0,162   
   (12,41)**    (10,91)** (11,39)** (11,63)** (12,39)**   
Dependency Ratio  -0,001    0,002 -0,002 0,007 -0,001   
   (0,13)    (0,33) (0,27) (1,01) (0,15)   
Household Size  -0,063  -0,075  -0,068  -0,065  -0,063  
   (2,50)*   (3,11)**  (2,80)**  (2,76)**  (2,49)*  
Population  -0,053 -0,069    -0,035  -0,103  -0,046   
   (1,72) (2,26)*    (1,30) (3,38)** (1,51)   
Cabecera  -0,005  -0,004    -0,008 -0,01 -0,005   
   (0,60)  (0,51)    (1,05) (1,38) (0,60)   
Tax/capita  -0,016  -0,006    -0,003 0,018 -0,017   
   (2,01)* (0,79)    (0,41) (2,99)**  (2,27)*   
Homicide Rate  -0,030 -0,025 -0,029    -0,024 -0,027 -0,026 
   (5,98)** (5,05)** (6,20)**    (5,02)**  (5,64)** (5,42)** 
Lagged Homicide Rate  -0,016 -0,015 -0,006    -0,010 -0,016 -0,006 
   (2,70)** (2,57)*  (1,12)    (1,83)  (2,76)**  (1,14) 
Displacement (receiving)  0,024 0,016 0,023 0,024    0,024 0,016 
   (5,74)** (3,85)** (5,51)** (6,30)**    (5,67)** (3,93)** 
Displacement (expulsing)  -0,020 -0,023 -0,013 -0,023  -0,019  -0,017 
   (2,99)** (3,51)** (2,09)*  (3,70)**    (2,91)** (2,61)** 
Attacks  0,005 0,005 0,006 0,001  0,005    0,006 
   (1,95) (1,90)  (2,52)* (0,57) (2,10)*    (2,28)* 
Constant  0,959  1,205  0,523 0,832 1,617 0,875 0,542 
   (2,68)** (3,83)** (3,17)** (2,61)**  (4,76)**  (2,48)* (12,27)** 
Observations  30738  30909  31878 33307 34538 30738 32054 
Number of Groups  16793  16882  17148 17780 18426 16793 17240 
R-squared  0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02  0,02  0,02 0,01 
  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note:  The table reports fixed effects estimates for the probability to be self-employed conditioning on being 
employed. We use a binary dependent variable, taking the value 1 if a person is self-employed and 0 for paid 
employment and unpaid family workers, respectively. All individuals aged 10 and above belonging to the working 
population were included in the sample. Variables population, tax/capita, homicide rate, lagged homicide rate, and 
displacement rates are in logs. Cabecera is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if municipality’s cabecera to 
account for urban-rural differences. Treatment is a dummy for participation in Familias en Acción. Time dummies 














Table 12: Probability of Self-Employment for Men 
   1  2  3 4 5 6 7 
Age  0,024    0,025 0,025 0,025 0,024   
   (4,96)**    (5,12)** (5,26)** (5,29)** (4,95)**   
Age Squared  0,000    0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000   
   (5,50)**    (5,53)** (5,92)** (6,04)** (5,49)**   
Treatment  0,160    0,135 0,144 0,136 0,160   
   (13,03)**    (11,33)** (12,05)** (12,52)** (13,01)**   
Dependency Ratio  -0,006    -0,004  -0,006 0,001 -0,006   
   (0,88)    (0,57) (0,93) (0,18) (0,89)   
Household Size  -0,075  -0,085  -0,073  -0,072  -0,075  
   (3,19)**    (3,71)** (3,21)** (3,28)** (3,18)**   
Population  -0,035 -0,050    -0,030  -0,036  -0,032   
   (1,25)  (1,80)    (1,17) (1,33) (1,13)   
Cabecera  -0,005 -0,006    -0,009  -0,012  -0,005   
   (0,74)  (0,76)    (1,29) (1,76) (0,74)   
Tax/capita  -0,016  -0,006    -0,006 0,008 -0,017   
   (2,24)* (0,86)    (0,96)  (1,48)  (2,43)*   
Homicide Rate  -0,023 -0,017 -0,023    -0,017 -0,022 -0,017 
   (4,97)** (3,66)** (5,08)**    (3,82)**  (4,82)** (3,91)** 
Lagged Homicide Rate  -0,018 -0,016 -0,009    -0,015 -0,019 -0,008 
   (3,33)** (2,87)**  (1,78)    (2,87)**  (3,37)**  (1,63) 
Displacement (receiving)  0,020 0,013 0,018 0,018    0,020 0,012 
   (5,06)** (3,22)** (4,64)** (5,10)**    (5,01)** (3,15)** 
Displacement (expulsing)  -0,019 -0,023 -0,014 -0,019  -0,018  -0,018 
   (3,08)** (3,80)** (2,27)*  (3,34)**    (3,03)** (2,95)** 
Attacks  0,003 0,002 0,004 0,000  0,003    0,003 
   (1,25) (0,93) (1,88) (0,14)  (1,15)    (1,36) 
Constant  0,426  0,919  0,085 0,287 0,383 0,380 0,396 
   (1,34)  (3,17)**  (0,67) (1,00) (1,29) (1,21)  (10,51)** 
Observations  29897  30148  30829 32408 33749 29897 31086 
Number of Groups  14547  14640  14705 15276 15800 14547 14797 
R-squared  0,03 0,01 0,02 0,02  0,02  0,03 0,01 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note:  The table reports fixed effects estimates for the probability to be self-employed. We use a binary dependent 
variable, taking the value 1 if a person is self-employed and 0 for paid employment and unpaid family workers, 
respectively. All individuals aged 10 and above belonging to the working population were included in the sample. 
Variables population, tax/capita, homicide rate, lagged homicide rate, and displacement rates are in logs. Cabecera 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if municipality’s cabecera to account for urban-rural differences. Treatment 
is a dummy for participation in Familias en Acción.  Time dummies were included. Estimation with robust 










Table 13: Probability of Self-Employment for Women 
   1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Age  0,018    0,019 0,015 0,018 0,018   
   (3,56)**    (3,83)** (3,11)** (3,77)** (3,55)**   
Age Squared  0,000    0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000   
   (4,07)**    (4,36)** (3,59)** (4,43)** (4,06)**   
Treatment  0,032    0,047 0,022 0,027 0,032   
   (3,03)**   (4,52)**  (2,19)*  (2,87)**  (3,02)**   
Dependency Ratio  0,007    0,007 0,003 0,008 0,007   
   (1,18)    (1,29) (0,60) (1,48) (1,18)   
Household Size  0,000    -0,009 -0,001 -0,002 0,000   
   (0,01)    (0,47) (0,05) (0,09) (0,01)   
Population  -0,048  -0,047  -0,030  -0,050  -0,045  
   (1,85) (1,97)*    (1,27)  (2,11)*  (1,75)   
Cabecera  0,006  0,007    0,004 0,005 0,006   
   (0,93)  (1,10)    (0,66) (0,80) (0,93)   
Tax/capita  0,006  0,007    0,008 0,004 0,005   
   (0,86)  (1,15)    (1,53) (0,84) (0,75)   
Homicide Rate  -0,007 -0,006  -0,015    -0,008 -0,006 -0,013 
   (1,68) (1,31)  (3,49)**    (2,01)*  (1,50)  (3,05)** 
Lagged Homicide Rate  -0,011 -0,011  -0,012    -0,011 -0,012 -0,011 
   (2,27)*  (2,24)*  (2,44)*  (2,53)*  (2,33)*  (2,43)* 
Displacement (receiving)  0,014  0,013 0,014 0,011    0,014 0,012 
   (4,07)**  (3,80)** (4,08)** (3,75)**    (4,05)** (3,61)** 
Displacement (expulsing)  -0,015  -0,017 -0,016 -0,015  -0,015  -0,017 
   (2,95)**  (3,22)** (3,05)** (3,11)**    (2,92)** (3,35)** 
Attacks  0,002  0,002 0,002 0,001 0,001    0,002 
   (0,88)  (0,91) (1,17) (0,44) (0,66)    (1,12) 
Constant  0,341  0,714 -0,203 0,163 0,343 0,310 0,234 
   (1,15)  (2,85)**  (1,50) (0,61) (1,30) (1,05)  (6,93)** 
Observations  23124  23343 23789 25055 25761 23124 24013 
Number of Groups  11664  11752 11751 12203 12538 11664 11840 
R-squared  0,01  0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note:  The table reports fixed effects estimates for the probability to be self-employed. We use a binary dependent 
variable, taking the value 1 if a person is self-employed and 0 for paid employment and unpaid family workers, 
respectively. All individuals aged 10 and above belonging to the working population were included in the sample. 
Variables population, tax/capita, homicide rate, lagged homicide rate, and displacement rates are in logs. Cabecera 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if municipality’s cabecera to account for urban-rural differences. Treatment 
is a dummy for participation in Familias en Acción.  Time dummies were included. Estimation with robust 














Table 14: Probability of Self-Employment for Men conditional on being employed 
   1  2  3 4 5 6 7 
Age  -0,001  0,001  0,002  0,000  -0,001  
   (0,13)    (0,17) (0,25) (0,03) (0,16)   
Age Squared  0,000    0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000   
   (0,24)    (0,30) (0,70) (0,32) (0,22)   
Treatment  0,192    0,160 0,173 0,157 0,192   
   (12,89)**    (11,08)** (11,86)** (11,95)** (12,87)**   
Dependency Ratio  -0,005    -0,002  -0,006 0,004 -0,006   
   (0,59)    (0,18) (0,75) (0,46) (0,61)   
Household Size  -0,077  -0,095  -0,083  -0,076  -0,078  
   (2,64)**    (3,35)** (2,95)** (2,78)** (2,65)**   
Population  -0,037 -0,056    -0,023  -0,093  -0,031   
   (1,08)  (1,67)    (0,76) (2,66)** (0,90)   
Cabecera  -0,008 -0,007    -0,012  -0,014  -0,008   
   (0,86)  (0,79)    (1,40) (1,64) (0,86)   
Tax/capita  -0,018  -0,007    -0,006 0,021 -0,020   
   (2,06)* (0,79)    (0,70) (3,11)**  (2,30)*   
Homicide Rate  -0,033 -0,027 -0,032    -0,026 -0,031 -0,027 
   (5,88)** (4,85)** (5,94)**    (4,91)**  (5,61)** (5,08)** 
Lagged Homicide Rate  -0,019 -0,018 -0,007    -0,012 -0,019 -0,007 
   (2,81)** (2,67)**  (1,09)    (2,00)*  (2,83)**  (1,10) 
Displacement (receiving)  0,024 0,015 0,022 0,026    0,024 0,014 
   (5,07)** (3,10)** (4,63)** (5,95)**    (5,00)** (3,04)** 
Displacement (expulsing)  -0,015 -0,020 -0,007 -0,020  -0,015  -0,011 
   (2,02)* (2,61)** (0,91)  (2,89)**    (1,94)  (1,46) 
Attacks  0,005 0,005 0,007 0,001  0,006    0,006 
   (1,73) (1,67)  (2,30)* (0,43) (1,99)*    (2,05)* 
Constant  1,017  1,086  0,467 0,747 1,775 0,938 0,465 
   (2,55)*  (3,09)**  (2,45)* (2,08)* (4,64)** (2,39)*  (10,08)** 
Observations  22460  22579  23252 24326 25391 22460 23375 
Number of Groups  11457  11511  11651 12061 12607 11457 11707 
R-squared  0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02  0,02  0,03 0,01 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note:  The table reports fixed effects estimates for the probability to be self-employed conditioning on being 
employed. We use a binary dependent variable, taking the value 1 if a person is self-employed and 0 for paid 
employment and unpaid family workers, respectively. All individuals aged 10 and above belonging to the working 
population were included in the sample. Variables population, tax/capita, homicide rate, lagged homicide rate, and 
displacement rates are in logs. Cabecera is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if municipality’s cabecera to 
account for urban-rural differences. Treatment is a dummy for participation in Familias en Acción.  Time dummies 














Table 15: Probability of Self-Employment for Women conditional on being employed 
   1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Age  0,021    0,014 0,011 0,022 0,021   
   (1,34)    (0,95) (0,74) (1,50) (1,34)   
Age Squared  0,000    0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000   
   (1,93)    (1,50) (1,23) (1,94) (1,92)   
Treatment  0,054    0,064 0,042 0,048 0,054   
   (2,01)*   (2,46)*  (1,63)  (2,02)*  (2,01)*   
Dependency Ratio  0,013    0,014 0,012 0,017 0,013   
   (1,08)    (1,23) (1,07) (1,49) (1,08)   
Household Size  0,009   0,001  0,010  -0,008  0,009   
   (0,18)    (0,01) (0,22) (0,17) (0,19)   
Population  -0,108  -0,105  -0,102  -0,144  -0,103  
   (1,52) (1,49)    (1,61)  (2,30)*  (1,46)   
Cabecera  0,002  0,004    0,003 0,001 0,002   
   (0,15)  (0,28)    (0,22) (0,05) (0,15)   
Tax/capita  0,004  0,005    0,016 0,013 0,003   
   (0,26)  (0,34)    (1,15) (1,06) (0,20)   
Homicide Rate  -0,012 -0,011  -0,017    -0,012 -0,011 -0,016 
   (1,12)  (1,06) (1,68)    (1,18) (1,02) (1,60) 
Lagged Homicide Rate  -0,011 -0,011  -0,009    -0,008 -0,012 -0,009 
   (0,90)  (0,89) (0,76)    (0,70) (0,95) (0,77) 
Displacement (receiving)  0,025  0,022 0,026 0,019    0,025 0,023 
   (2,92)** (2,65)**  (3,16)** (2,44)*    (2,90)**  (2,83)** 
Displacement (expulsing)  -0,034  -0,035 -0,036 -0,030  -0,034  -0,037 
   (2,53)*  (2,63)**  (2,75)**  (2,42)*  (2,53)*  (2,88)** 
Attacks  0,002  0,003 0,003 0,001 0,002    0,003 
   (0,48)  (0,53) (0,52) (0,28) (0,42)    (0,55) 
Constant  1,249  1,609 0,275 1,371 1,562 1,194 0,541 
   (1,50)  (2,20)* (0,68)  (1,83) (2,17)* (1,44)  (6,06)** 
Observations  8276  8328 8624 8979 9145 8276 8677 
Number of Groups  5386  5421 5547 5775 5875 5386 5583 
R-squared  0,02  0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note:  The table reports fixed effects estimates for the probability to be self-employed conditioning on being 
employed. We use a binary dependent variable, taking the value 1 if a person is self-employed and 0 for paid 
employment and unpaid family workers, respectively. All individuals aged 10 and above belonging to the working 
population were included in the sample. Variables population, tax/capita, homicide rate, lagged homicide rate, and 
displacement rates are in logs. Cabecera is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if municipality’s cabecera to 
account for urban-rural differences. Treatment is a dummy for participation in Familias en Acción.  Time dummies 













Table 16: Probability of Self-Employment conditional on being employed for subgroups of the 
population 
The following tables show the effects of displacement rates (by expulsing and receiving community) interacted 
with certain different categories such as age, gender, education and household position.  The dependent variable 
and the included independent variables (covariates, homicide rates and attacks) correspond to regressions 
displayed in table 10. 
We performed an F-test to test for equality of coefficients displayed after each group of interactions. The 
hypothesis that coefficients are not significantly different, could never be rejected on the 5% level. 
 
A. By age groups 
   1 2 3 4 6 7 
Displacement (receiving)*Age 10-25  0,020 0,009 0,020 0,019 0,019 0,011 
   (2,62)** (1,18) (2,70)**  (2,80)**  (2,54)*  (1,41) 
Displacement (receiving)*Age 25-40  0,029 0,021 0,029 0,029 0,029 0,023 
   (4,91)** (3,59)** (5,08)** (5,28)** (4,85)** (4,01)** 
Displacement (receiving)*Age 40+  0,021 0,014 0,017  0,02  0,021 0,012 
   (3,47)**  (2,33)* (2,87)** (3,73)** (3,42)**  (1,96) 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,453  0,3548 0,2275 0,3605 0,4489 0,1942 
Displacement (expulsing)*Age 10-25  -0,018 -0,020 -0,012 -0,021 -0,017 -0,014 
   (1,89) (2,09)* (1,31) (2,48)* (1,81)  (1,54) 
Displacement (expulsing)*Age 25-40  -0,026 -0,029 -0,021 -0,030 -0,025 -0,025 
   (3,40)** (3,85)** (2,88)** (4,23)** (3,33)** (3,34)** 
Displacement (expulsing)*Age 40+  -0,014 -0,018 -0,006 -0,016 -0,014 -0,010 
   (1,78) (2,30)* (0,78) (2,15)* (1,74)  (1,29) 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,2726 0,2803 0,1001 0,1154 0,2769 0,1049 
Observations  30738 30908 31878 33307 30738 32053 
Number of groups  16793 16882 17148 17780 16793 17240 
R-squared  0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
B. By gender 
   1 2 3 4 6 7 
Displacement (receiving)*Male  0,025 0,017 0,023 0,026 0,025 0,016 
   (5,44)** (3,73)** (4,99)** (6,01)** (5,37)** (3,58)** 
Displacement (receiving)*Female  0,018 0,010 0,020 0,017 0,018 0,014 
   (2,28)*  (1,27) (2,62)**  (2,30)* (2,23)*  (1,77) 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,4151 0,4145 0,7705 0,2694 0,4143 0,7648 
Displacement (expulsing)*Male  -0,021 -0,024 -0,013 -0,023 -0,020 -0,017 
   (2,88)**  (3,35)** (1,87) (3,48)**  (2,81)**  (2,34)* 
Displacement (expulsing)*Female  -0,015 -0,019 -0,013 -0,019 -0,015 -0,017 
   (1,40) (1,73) (1,26) (1,94) (1,34) (1,60) 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,6492 0,6520 0,9898 0,7210 0,6406 0,9715 
Observations  30736 30907 31876 33305 30736 32052 
Number of groups  16791 16880 17146 17778 16791 17238 
R-squared  0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 









C. By household position 
   1 2 3 4 6 7 
Displacement (receiving)*Head  0,022 0,015 0,020 0,019 0,021 0,015 
   (4,08)** (2,86)** (3,85)** (3,96)** (4,02)** (2,87)** 
Displacement (receiving)*Son/Daughter  0,025 0,015 0,024 0,030 0,025 0,015 
   (3,39)**  (2,00)*  (3,29)** (4,45)** (3,34)**  (2,08)* 
Displacement (receiving)*Spouse  0,028 0,019 0,029 0,028 0,027 0,022 
   (2,37)* (1,62) (2,52)*  (2,71)**  (2,34)* (1,91) 
Displacement (receiving)*Other  0,036 0,023 0,030 0,038 0,036 0,019 
   (2,58)** (1,64)  (2,10)*  (2,88)**  (2,56)*  (1,34) 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,7741 0,9407 0,8431 0,3996 0,7740 0,9943 
Displacement (expulsing)*Head  -0,016 -0,020 -0,010 -0,016 -0,016 -0,013 
   (2,22)*  (2,69)** (1,38)  (2,36)* (2,15)*  (1,82) 
Displacement (expulsing)*Son/Daughter  -0,022 -0,026 -0,016 -0,034 -0,022 -0,020 
   (2,26)*  (2,61)** (1,66) (3,81)**  (2,22)* (2,03)* 
Displacement (expulsing)*Spouse  -0,030 -0,032 -0,026 -0,030 -0,029 -0,029 
   (2,12)* (2,31)*  (1,91)  (2,43)* (2,09)* (2,17)* 
Displacement (expulsing)*Other  -0,028 -0,030 -0,019 -0,032 -0,027 -0,022 
   (1,92) (2,08)* (1,29) (2,43)* (1,88)  (1,49) 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,6935 0,7379 0,6303 0,1969 0,6900 0,6205 
Observations  30736 30907 31876 33305 30736 32052 
Number of groups  16791 16880 17146 17778 16791 17238 
R-squared  0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
D. By education 
   1 2 3 4 6 7 
Displacement (receiving)*None  0,016 0,005 0,010 0,019 0,015 0,002 
   (1,47) (0,45) (0,96)  (1,97)*  (1,43) (0,16) 
Displacement (receiving)*Primary  0,022 0,013 0,021 0,022 0,021 0,014 
   (4,15)** (2,58)** (4,02)** (4,54)** (4,05)** (2,71)** 
Displacement (receiving)*Secondary  0,023 0,023 0,023 0,016 0,023 0,023 
   (2,32)* (2,31)* (2,36)* (1,71)  (2,32)* (2,38)* 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,8502 0,4555 0,6001 0,8204 0,8443 0,3221 
Displacement (expulsing)*None  -0,013 -0,014 0,001 -0,021 -0,012 -0,001 
   (0,74) (0,79) (0,07) (1,25) (0,67) (0,04) 
Displacement (expulsing)*Primary  -0,024 -0,029 -0,020 -0,026 -0,023 -0,024 
   (2,83)** (3,39)**  (2,47)* (3,32)** (2,76)** (2,94)** 
Displacement (expulsing)*Secondary  -0,041 -0,044 -0,031 -0,035 -0,041 -0,034 
   (2,76)**  (2,92)** (2,10)*  (2,49)* (2,76)** (2,34)* 
F-Test: Prob > F   0,4490 0,4428 0,3718 0,7965 0,4183 0,3316 
Observations  30738 30909 31878 33307 30738 32054 
Number of groups  16793 16882 17148 17780 16793 17240 
R-squared  0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 